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Abstract 
This paper explores the impact of environmental uncertainty, specific investments and formal contracts on the 
performance of automaker-supplier relationships from two major theoretical perspectives: transaction cost theory 
(TCT) and resource-based view (RBV). The empirical data were collected from the component suppliers in the 
Austrian automotive industry. The findings show that, based on TCT, environmental uncertainty and transaction-
specific investment negatively and, based on RBV, relationship-specific investments positively influence inter-
organizational performance. In addition, formal contract reduces the negative performance effect of transaction-
specific investment and environmental uncertainty, and environmental uncertainty increases the positive impact of 
relationship-specific investments on inter-organizational performance. Overall, we contribute to the inter-
organizational performance literature by combining TCT and RBV to explain relationship performance. 
Keywords: Automotive supply networks, Performance, Environmental uncertainty; Specific investments, Formal Contracts. 
1. Introduction 
Fast-changing technologies and the pressure of intense competition have led to accelerated growth of 
businesses through inter-organizational networks such as strategic alliances (Lee and Cavusgil, 2006). In 
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other words, nowadays a firm’s competitive advantage depends on the strength of its network ties that are 
embedded in social relationships and in interfirm-specific resources and capabilities. A growing body of 
work indicates that resource commitments and the flow of coordinated actions between the network 
members increase relationship performance by enhancing cooperative orientation in producing mutual 
benefits (Matanda and Freeman, 2009). Despite the dominance of the economic perspective in inter-
organizational performance literature, performance implications of the resource-based view of strategy, 
arguing about how complementarity and co-specialization among resources contribute to creating 
competitive advantage, have received increasing attention in recent years (Artz, 1999; Madhok and 
Tallman, 1998; Matanda and Freeman, 2009). Increased interest in the research based on RBV began to 
shift the fundamental governance question on how exchange relationships can be structured in order to 
economize on transaction costs to the question on how exchange relationships can be structured to 
maximize transaction value (Dyer, 1997; Skjøtt-Larsen et al., 2007; Zajac and Olsen, 1993). Thus, 
addressing how firms utilize collaborative strategies (i.e., through making investments in co-specialized 
assets) has become important to assess performance (Lui et al., 2009). Especially in uncertain business 
and technological environments firms applying networking and relational strategies can better manage the 
sequential processes of the exchange relationship through inter-organizational coordination and 
cooperation (Heide and John, 1990; Kim, 1999), which in turn leads to better performance. Such a 
collaboration helps them integrate new knowledge that results in performance-enhancing technology and 
innovation (Dyer and Singh, 1998; Dyer and Nobeoka, 2000; Lui et al., 2009; Paulraj and Chen, 2007; 
Powell et al., 1996). Accordingly, the aim of this study is to explore the impact of the transactional factors 
(environmental uncertainty, specific investments and formal contracts) on the performance of 
collaboration in automaker-supplier relationships from the two major theoretical perspectives: transaction 
cost theory (TCT) and resource-based view (RBV). 
 
The tendency of original equipment manufacturers to develop closer and deeply committed ties with 
their component suppliers increasingly reduces the traditional, adversarial tone of the automaker-supplier 
relationships (known as arm’s length transactional style of the US firms). The diffusion of voice strategy 
(Helper, 1991) in building relationships allows automakers opportunities to earn greater rents through 
access to complementary skills and knowledge and hence changes the cost-benefit calculus of the TC-
perspective in the case of a stream of potentially appropriable quasi-rents (Artz, 1999; Dyer and Chu, 
2000; Madhok and Tallman, 1998). Relatedly, the researchers (Artz, 1999; Heide, 1994; Hendrikse and 
Windsperger, 2011; Lui et al., 2009; Rokkan et al., 2003) argue that the bonding effect of relationship-
specific investments based on RBV can be one of the most important determinants of buyer-supplier 
relationships. More specifically, this study focuses on the question whether investments in specialized 
assets lead to improved performance as they foster cooperation. In order to investigate the changing 
effects of specific investments on inter-organizational performance this study differentiates between 
transaction-specific and relationship-specific investments as determinants of inter-organizational 
performance. The data from the Austrian automotive supplier network indicate that transaction-specific 
assets at stake negatively impact the performance of automaker-supplier relationships based on the TCT, 
whereas relationship-specific investments result in better performance by the super-additive effect of 
cooperation and coordination (Gulati et al., 2012). This finding supports the argument that relationship-
specific investments may improve inter-organizational performance by shifting the nature of relationship 
from a more safeguarding to mutually-oriented one (Artz, 1999; Madhok and Tallmann, 1998). In 
addition, the results of this study show that environmental uncertainty reduces the performance of 
automaker-supplier relationships due to the adaptation problems. But more importantly, we tested the 
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relative efficacy of formal contracts in absorbing the increasing performance risks under high 
environmental uncertainty and high transaction-specific investments. We found that formal contracts as 
cooperation and coordination device increase relationship performance by reducing opportunism risk and 
adaptation problems under high environmental uncertainty and transaction-specific investments. 
Moreover, the results indicate that the performance-enhancing effect of relationship-specific investments 
increase with environmental uncertainty. Overall, we contribute to the inter-organizational performance 
literature by combining TCT and RBT to explain relationship performance.  
2. Literature Review And Hypotheses  
2.1. Environmental Uncertainty and Relationship Performance 
When market prices serve as an insufficient statistics to induce market changes, environmental 
uncertainty causes adaptation and information processing problems (Gulati et al., 2005; Paulin and 
Ferguson, 2010; Rindfleisch and Heide, 1997). This situation requires a more cooperative form of 
adaptation in which coordination can be achieved by realigning incentives and responsibilities as 
circumstances change (Williamson, 1991). Cooperative adaptation restores inter-organizational efficiency 
by promoting information exchange and integration. According to the TCT, environmental uncertainty 
increases exchange hazards due to risks arising from misalignment of incentives and responsibilities as 
circumstances change (Mellewigt et al., 2012), and hence leads to negative performance effects (Heide, 
1994; Lee and Cavusgil, 2006; Noordewier et al., 1990; Poppo and Zenger, 2002). 
 
H1: Environmental uncertainty negatively affects relationship performance. 
2.2. Specific Investments and Relationship Performance: Specialized vs. Co-specialized Assets 
According to the transaction cost theory (Williamson, 1985), transaction-specific investments as 
specific investments that cannot be re-deployed for alternative purposes result in high switching costs. 
This lock-in situation exposes the investing party (especially from the supply-side) to opportunism risks 
as the other party (i.e., automaker/assembler) seeks to maximize self-interest with guile (Williamson 
1975) during the execution of the contract (Buvik and Grønhaug, 2000; Heide and Stump, 1995; Joskow, 
2008; Rindfleish and Heide, 1997; Segal and Whinston, 2000; Martinez-Noya et al., 2013; Whinston, 
2003). The lack of an effective governance mechanism to reduce the appropriation concern of the 
suppliers creates unwillingness to undertake specific investments in complementary resources in order to 
develop innovative products and processes (Dyer, 1997; Williamson, 1991). When the success of a 
relationship depends on the joint efforts of the partners, costly bargaining over the appropriable quasi-
rents undermines the potential gains from cooperation. Hence, transaction-specific investments are likely 
to reduce the performance of inter-organizational relationships due to hold-up risk and high ex-post 
transaction costs (Heide and Stump, 1995; Lui et al., 2009; Luo, 2007; Parkhe, 1993; Pilling et al., 1994). 
 
H2a: Transaction-specific investments negatively affect relationship performance.  
 
However, unlike the transaction-cost-increasing effect of making commitments to specialized 
investments, the relational view of inter-organizational competitive advantage drawing on the resource-
based view and the transaction cost theory suggests that transaction costs do not necessarily increase with 
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a higher level of specific investments (Dyer, 1997). Transaction cost theory has been criticized for 
focusing primarily on the unilateral sunk costs of specialized investments that negatively affect inter-
organizational performance (Artz, 1999; Madhok and Tallman, 1998). This argument of TC-perspective 
neglects the relationship-specific interdependence in generating transaction value. Investments in 
relationship-specific assets create a higher transaction value that exceeds the potential hold-up gains from 
opportunistic behavior when they serve as mutual commitments or self-enforcing mechanisms in the 
process of value creation (Hendrikse and Windsperger, 2011; Jap and Anderson, 2003; Klein et al., 1978; 
Madhok and Tallman, 1998; Rokkan et al., 2003; Zajac and Olsen, 1993). In this case, the value creation 
effect of specific investments motivates both sides of a dyadic relationship to behave cooperatively in 
order to realize relational rents, which in turn increases efficiency and effectiveness of inter-
organizational relationship (Ghosh and John, 1999; Lui et al., 2009). Consequently, as Vivek et al. (2008) 
argues, two distinct effects of specific assets must be considered to evaluate the impact of specific 
investments on performance (Artz, 1999; Madhok and Tallman, 1998): The rent-yielding relationship-
specific investment effect based on the RBV and the transaction-specific investment effect based on the 
TCT. Relationship-specific investments (i.e., co-investments in business process assets) are relevant to 
mutual development and relational learning. This type of specific investments increases the parties’ 
interdependence and future orientation, thereby serving as an economic rational of cooperative 
relationships (Dyer, 1997). When co-specialized investments lead to self-enforcing contracts, they give 
rise to greater transaction value and lower transaction costs and hence result in improved performance 
(Artz, 1999; Dyer, 1997; Madhok and Tallman, 1998).  
   
H2b: Relationship-specific investments positively affect relationship performance.  
2.3. Formal Contracts and Relationship Performance 
Formal contracts offer a legal and institutional framework that guides exchange relationships by 
stipulating promises or obligations to perform particular actions in the future (Lui et al., 2009; Liu et al., 
2009; Poppo and Zenger, 2008). When the parties in the buyer-supplier relationship negotiate the terms of 
formal agreements, their formal documents represent a cooperative effort to set up self-enforcing 
contracts that enhance relationship performance (Boyle and Dwyer, 1995; Dwyer et al., 1987). 
 
H3: Formal contracts positively affect relationship performance.  
2.4. Interaction Effects  
Formal contracts may lead to better performance by providing beneficial solutions to the safeguarding 
and adaptation problems in inter-organizational relationships (Rindfleisch and Heide, 1997; Williamson, 
1985, 1991). Under high transaction-specific investments and a high level of environmental uncertainty 
formal contracts enable the exchange parties to reduce opportunism and adaptation problems by 
improving cooperation and coordination that result in higher inter-organizational performance. 
Consequently, we expect two performance-enhancing moderating effects of formal contracts:  
 
H4a1: Formal contracts enhance relationship performance by weakening the negative impact of 
transaction-specific investments on performance. 
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H4a2: Formal contracts enhance relationship performance by weakening the negative impact of 
environmental uncertainty on performance.  
 
When cooperation and coordination are interdependent (Gulati et al., 2012), increasing environmental 
uncertainty (especially arising from changes in product/process technologies) should be managed through 
choosing a collaborative strategy that encourages the sharing of resources and capabilities to co-develop 
products (Asanuma, 1989; Dyer and Singh, 1998; Mahapatra et al., 2010; Rangan et al., 1993). Such 
investments in co-specialized assets and inter-organizational routines enable information sharing under a 
cooperative regime that facilitates planning and adaptation to unforeseeable changes (Sawhney Celly et 
al., 1999). Close cooperation under high uncertainty allowing partners to take advantage of flexibility 
benefits gives rise to the development of mutually beneficial solutions that improves relationship 
performance. Therefore, the performance-enhancing effect of relationship-specific investments increases 
with environmental uncertainty, because relationship-specific collaboration is more important for value 
creation in a highly uncertain business environment. Thus, we expect that the environmental uncertainty 
increases the positive performance effect of relationship-specific investments. 
 
H4b: The positive impact of relationship-specific investments on relationship performance increases 
with environmental uncertainty. 
3. Methodology    
The aim of this research is to analyze the determinants (environmental uncertainty, specific 
investments and formal contracts) of inter-organizational performance in the automotive supply networks. 
To test the hypotheses, the empirical data were collected through a questionnaire-based survey. The 
questionnaire was sent out electronically to the sales managers/executives of 193 firms accepted to 
participate in the survey from a total of 275 supplier firms operating in the Austrian automotive industry 
and 83 valid responses were received. Relationship performance was measured by asking component 
suppliers to assess the efficiency and effectiveness of inter-organizational exchange activities consistent 
with the study of Boyle and Dwyer (1995). To measure environmental uncertainty, 4-item scale of 
Bensaou and Venkatraman (1995) was used. Following Asanuma (1989) and Dyer and Singh (1998), the 
construct of relationship-specific investments was measured with four items to capture the extent to 
which co-investments in business process assets are made by the automakers and the suppliers. On the 
other hand, transaction-specific investments refer to the investments and adaptations deployed by the 
suppliers in the physical assets, production facilities and tools tailored to the relationship. This concept 
was measured based on the items developed by Buvik and Reve (2002). Formal contracts are related to 
the degree of complexity. The items for contractual complexity reflect the extent to which contracts detail 
roles and responsibilities to be performed, specify procedures for monitoring and penalties for 
noncompliance, and also determine outcomes or outputs to be delivered (Poppo and Zenger, 2002, p. 
708). The variables of industrial dependency and frequency of transactions, which might influence the 
performance of relationship between automakers and suppliers, were also incorporated in the empirical 
model.  
 
In this study, exploratory factor analysis with varimax rotation was conducted to check the validity of 
the constructs. The Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin (KMO) measure of sampling adequacy is 0.77 and the Bartlett 
test of sphericity is highly significant (Bartlett's Test: 1381.873; p = 0.00), indicating that the data are 
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suitable for factor analysis. The exploratory factor analysis yielded a five-factor solution accounting for 
71.64 percent of the cumulative variance (see Appendix A). According to the Kaiser rule (Kaiser, 1960) 
the factors were retained with eigenvalues greater than 1. Factor loadings of the 24 items are above 0.50 
(Hair et al., 1998), ranging from 0.57 to 0.89. In addition, reliability analysis shows that Cronbach’s alpha 
values of all constructs exceed the recommended threshold level of 0.70 (Hair et al., 1998). The findings 
provide evidence for sufficient internal consistency with construct validity of the measurement scales. 
Table 1 presents the correlations between the variables used in the regression analysis. None of the 




Table 1. Descriptive statistics and correlations (N = 83) 
 
4. Regression Results 
 
The hypotheses were tested by applying multiple regression analysis (see Table 2). Before creating the 
interaction terms, the scores of the main effects were mean centered to avoid potential problem of 
multicollinearity. The results from analyzing variance inflation factors show that the largest variance 
inflation factor as an indicator of probable multicollinearity is 2.035, i.e. well below the 10.0 cutoff (Neter 
et al., 1985). Model 1 in Table 2 is used to examine the effects of control variables on relationship 
performance. The results show that relationship performance decreases with the increase in suppliers’ 
industrial dependency (β=  ̶ 0.303; p<0.05). In addition, the influence of high-frequency trading on 
performance tends to be positive (β=  + 0.303; p<0.1). The results of Model 2 show that the relationship 
between environmental uncertainty and performance is negative and significant, supporting H1 (β= 
0.336; p<0.05). Similarly, transaction-specific investments exert a significant and negative effect on 
relationship performance, in support of H2a (β= 0.275; p<0.05). In addition, the impact of relationship-
specific investments and formal contracts are both positive and significant in improving performance (β= 
+0.301; p<0.05; β=  +0.188; p<0.01). These results support H2b and H3. Furthermore, the interaction 
effects between transaction cost variables (transaction-specific investments and environmental 
uncertainty) and formal contracts as governance mechanisms were included in Model 3b that tests 
hypotheses H4a1 and H4a2. The interaction between transaction-specific investments and formal contracts 
is positive and significant (β= +0.258; p<0.05) but the interaction between environmental uncertainty and 
formal contracts is not significant. This finding provides support for the performance-enhancing effect of 
formal contracts through reducing opportunistic risks arising from investments in transaction-specific 
assets. On the other hand, managing environmental uncertainty due to changes in product/process 
technologies requires collaborative strategies that maximize partnership’s value-creation opportunities. 
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Hence consistent with H4b, the results indicate that the value creation effect of relationship-specific 
investments increases with environmental uncertainty. Model 4 supports the super-additive impact of 
relationship-specific investments in improving performance under high environmental uncertainty (β=  
+0.219; p < 0.1; β = +0.195; p < 0.1)  
 
 
Table 2. Hypotheses testing with hierarchical multivariate regression (N = 83)+ 
5. Conclusion 
This paper explores the impact of environmental uncertainty, specific investments and formal contracts 
on inter-organizational performance related with cooperation and coordination issues of governance. To 
examine cooperation and coordination issues in inter-firm alliances, the study investigates the impact of 
specific investments on relationship performance based on two major theoretical perspectives: transaction 
cost theory (TCT) and resource-based view (RBV). Consistent with the work of Vivek et al. (2008), we 
differentiate rent-yielding relationship-specific investments at the core of the RBV from the transaction-
specific investments based on TCT. The data collected from Austrian automotive supply network indicate 
that the suppliers’ transaction-specific investments in the physical assets and production facilities lead to 
lower relationship performance due to hold-up behaviour of the manufacturers. Similarly, the findings 
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Furthermore, we show that higher environmental uncertainty arising from changes in product/process 
technologies requires a collaborative strategy that enables the alliance partners to explore value-creation 
opportunities in order to increase relationship performance. This kind of collaborative strategies (through 
relationship-specific investments) may create super-additive effects in improving relationship 
performance. Co-investments of the partners in business processes reinforce relational learning under a 
cooperative regime and hence support coordination by providing flexible adjustments to unforeseeable 
changes. In conclusion, the results of this study support the super-additive impact of relationship-specific 
investments in improving performance based on the mutual-reinforcement principle of coordination and 
cooperation. Overall, this study contributes to the inter-organizational governance literature by 
developing a combined TCT and RBV of relationship performance.   
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Appendix A. Factor analytic evidence for the construct validity of the five-factor subscale scores (N = 83) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
